Infrastructure and PPP contracts: anti-corruption design to curb opportunistic renegotiations
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.34117/bjdv11n9-061Keywords:
Public–private partnerships, infrastructure governance, opportunistic renegotiations, contract design, transparency, fiscal oversight, OECD case studies, anti-corruption safeguardsAbstract
Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are widely promoted as mechanisms to deliver infrastructure efficiently, stimulate innovation, and allocate risks between public and private actors. However, many PPPs are characterized by opportunistic renegotiations that reallocate risks and rents after contract award, often under conditions of weak transparency and limited competitive pressure. Such practices undermine value for money, distort future bidding incentives, and erode public trust. This article investigates which safeguards reduce opportunistic renegotiations in PPPs by combining a systematic meta-analytic review of empirical literature with comparative case studies from the United States and OECD jurisdictions. The evidence highlights that transparent and competitive procurement, realistic risk allocation, rigorous project preparation, standardized contracts, independent PPP units with fiscal oversight, integrity and transparency mechanisms, pre-agreed adjustment rules, and performance-based monitoring consistently reduce the incidence, timing, and fiscal cost of renegotiations. The study contributes by synthesizing dispersed lessons into a practical, evidence-based checklist that public authorities can institutionalize to enhance predictability and integrity in PPP governance.
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