Berkeley’s God and solipsism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.34117/bjdv10n5-007Keywords:
solipsism, god, argument, esse est percipi, beetle, language, thought experiment, inter-subjectiveAbstract
In this paper I provide a meta-analysis of Berkeley’s argument of ‘esse est percipi.’ – to be is to be perceived. I also propose an alternative way Berkeley, could have solved the problem of solipsism without invoking God. I borrow from Wittgenstein’s use of language - to overcome the solipsism of the beetle thought experiment. Similarly, one could also think of escaping solipsist framework of Berkeley by invoking the notion of web of concepts.
References
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WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1999). Philosophical Investigations. 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
